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Monetary policy typically operates 
by targeting a short-term interest 
rate. For example, in the United 
n the United States, the Federal Reserve sets 
monetary policy by targeting the federal funds 
rate. This process usually involves lowering 
short-term interest rates when economic 
growth is weak and raising them when economic growth 
is strong. A wide class of economic models has shown 
that, in theory, conducting policy in this way allows the 
economy to employ resources efficiently. In addition, many 
empirical studies have shown that most central banks 
actually behave in this manner. In normal times, it is fairly 
easy for the central bank to conduct policy in this fashion. 
But there is one instance when conducting policy in this 
manner becomes problematic: when the economy finds 
itself in a “liquidity trap,” a situation in which the short-
term nominal interest rate is zero or very close to zero. In 
this article, Mike Dotsey analyzes the difficulties a central 
bank faces in such circumstances and discusses the tools 
available to monetary policymakers. Policy as usual is not 
an option, and the central bank’s framework for
conducting policy must change. 
States, the Federal Reserve targets the 
federal funds rate. In order to conduct 
monetary policy, central banks 
generally vary the short-term interest 
rate target in response to economic 
conditions. They do so because 
setting the short-term interest rate 
at a level consistent with economic 
fundamentals generally attains both 
the most efficient level of output1 and 
an inflation rate consistent with long-
run inflation objectives. 
 This process usually involves 
lowering short-term interest rates when 
economic growth is weak or inflation 
or expected inflation is below some 
desired rate and raising them when the 
economy is growing strongly or when 
inflation or expectations of inflation 
are high. It has been theoretically 
shown in a wide class of economic 
models that conducting policy in this 
way allows the economy to employ 
resources efficiently. Low and stable 
inflation is a desirable feature of a well-
managed economy, and setting the 
interest rate in a pro-cyclical manner is 
consistent with economic efficiency. 
This way of conducting monetary 
policy is not just theoretically 
sound. Many empirical studies have 
shown that most central banks 
actually behave in this manner. This 
description of monetary policy — 
varying the interest rate in response to 
inflation and economic activity — is 
called a Taylor rule or a Taylor-type 
rule, named after John Taylor, who first 
described these types of policies. 
In normal times it is fairly easy 
for the central bank to conduct policy 
according to a Taylor-type rule. But 
there is one instance when conducting 
policy in this manner becomes 
problematic: when the economy finds 
itself in a “liquidity trap,” which is 
defined as a situation in which the 
1 The efficient level of output is the output 
that would occur if all prices and wages were 
continuously adjusted in response to changes in 
economic conditions.10   Q2  2010 Business Review   www.philadelphiafed.org
                                     
                                             
                                           
                                   
                           
2 For a more detailed discussion, see my 2004 
Business Review article.
short-term nominal interest rate is zero 
or very close to zero. 
Because the nominal interest 
rate is generally bounded below by 
zero, the central bank cannot lower 
interest rates further even if it would 
be desirable to do so, as it would be if 
the economy were in a deep recession. 
Furthermore, as I’ll discuss below, in 
this situation, trying to stimulate the 
economy by injecting more money 
or liquidity through open market 
operations may have little or no effect 
on output. Therefore, it may appear 
that monetary policy is impotent under 
these conditions.
This article analyzes the 
difficulties a central bank faces in such 
circumstances and discusses the tools 
available to monetary policymakers. 
Policy as usual is not an option, 
and the central bank’s framework 
for conducting policy must change. 
Importantly, it must change in ways 
that alter individuals’ expectations of 
what policy will be like when the zero 
lower bound on interest rates is no 
longer binding. 
 Thus, the conduct of monetary 
policy becomes quite subtle and 
depends on the credibility of proposed 
future actions.  Further, economists 
have been concerned about the design 
of appropriate monetary policy in a 
liquidity trap for quite some time, and 
in what follows, I will draw heavily 
on the work of Gauti Eggertsson and 
Michael Woodford;  Alan Auerbach 
and Maurice Obstfeld; and Paul 
Krugman.
ECONOMIC PROBLEMS 
ASSOCIATED WITH A 
LIQUIDITY TRAP
To understand the economic 
problems that ensue when an economy 
is in a liquidity trap, we must first 
understand the concept of the real 
interest rate and its role in efficiently 
allocating economic resources. What 
follows will be a fairly abbreviated 
analysis.2 
The real interest rate, defined as 
the nominal interest rate less expected 
inflation, plays an important role in 
determining what fraction of output 
is consumed and what fraction is in-
vested. In a perfectly competitive econ-
omy, the movement of the real interest 
rate in response to economic shocks is 
consistent with the optimal allocation 
of economic resources. That is, the 
real rate responds in such a way that 
the level of output and its allocation 
between consumption and investment 
is the one that provides the highest 
level of economic welfare. This interest 
rate, which is associated with perfect 
competition, is generally referred to 
as the economy’s natural interest rate.  
For example, strong economic growth 
is associated with an opportune time 
to make investments, especially if 
that growth is generated by increased 
productivity. At such times, consum-
ers are also wealthier and hence desire 
more consumption. In order to induce 
enough saving for financing the opti-
mal quantity of investment, the real 
interest rate rises. Thus, resources are 
allocated toward increasing the capital 
stock, which, in turn, results in higher 
future output, higher future consump-
tion, and higher wages. Analogously, 
when the economy is weak, the real in-
terest rate falls, and when the economy 
is very weak, the real interest rate may 
even become negative. A negative real 
interest rate is sometimes observed 
during recessions.
Generating a Liquidity Trap. If 
the economy is sufficiently weak that a 
real interest rate below zero is desir-
able, it is possible for the economy to 
enter a liquidity trap.  As indicated 
above, the real interest rate is defined 
as the nominal interest rate minus the 
expected rate of inflation.  But this 
means that the nominal interest rate 
is the sum of two components: the real 
interest rate and the expected rate of 
inflation. This relationship is known 
as the Fisher equation. Importantly, 
the nominal interest rate cannot be 
negative because no one would lend at 
a negative rate. If they did, they would 
get less money back than they lent, 
and they would be better off putting 
their money in their mattress. Thus, 
in a liquidity trap, when the nominal 
interest rate is zero and a negative 
real interest rate is also desirable, the 
Fisher equation implies that expected 
inflation must be equal and of opposite 
sign to this negative real interest rate. 
Therefore, the desirability of a negative 
real interest rate implies the desirabil-
ity of positive expected inflation. 
If features of the economy prevent 
prices from adjusting flexibly, expected 
inflation may, in the end, not be 
high enough to generate a sufficiently 
low real interest rate. The monetary 
authority is also unable to lower the 
nominal rate below zero. Thus, in ad-
dition to the economic shocks that are   Business Review  Q2  2010   11 www.philadelphiafed.org
                                          
                                              
                                            
                                    
              
3 Currency earns a zero rate of interest and other 
types of money, such as bank reserves, have, 
until quite recently, earned a zero rate of inter-
est. When short-term bonds, such as Treasury 
bills, earn a positive rate of interest, holding 
money incurs an opportunity cost in terms of 
forgone interest.
responsible for the recession, interest 
rates cannot adjust in an optimal way. 
The presence of the liquidity trap 
places the economy in even greater 
jeopardy. Furthermore, because money 
and bonds are now perfect substi-
tutes — each is earning a zero rate of 
interest — the inflation rate is not a 
current monetary policy phenomenon. 
The fact that both assets are now 
earning the same zero rate of interest 
implies that the public is indifferent 
between the relative amounts of money 
and bonds in its portfolio.3 Therefore, 
current open market operations that 
alter the amount of bonds and money 
in public hands have no impact on 
inflation. Second, with no opportunity 
cost for holding money, the public is 
willing to hold just about any amount 
of money the central bank supplies. 
Thus, current injections of money 
have little effect on prices or inflation. 
This is why the occurrence of a zero 
nominal interest rate is called a liquid-
ity trap. 
However, future monetary policy 
can prove effective in the current 
environment, but understanding the 
subtle and indirect way in which that 
happens requires an understanding of 
how monetary policy affects prices in 
more normal times. 
Controlling the Price Level and 
Inflation. In normal times, standard 
economic models suggest that a central 
bank should adjust the short-term 
nominal interest rate one-for-one with 
perceived movements in the real inter-
est rate. This type of policy engenders 
an efficient economic response to the 
various types of disturbances that 
affect economic activity. Moreover, 
this type of policy is consistent with 
a policy of low and stable inflation. 
Only policy changes that move the 
real interest rate by larger amounts 
than dictated by underlying economic 
fundamentals have a substantive effect 
on inflation and economic activity. For 
example, a severe tightening of policy 
raises the short-term real interest rate 
above its efficient or natural level, tem-
porarily choking off consumption and 
investment. The tightening of policy 
also brings down inflation. A good 
example is the disinflation during the 
tenure of Fed Chairman Paul Volcker, 
when the Fed maintained very high 
nominal and real interest rates. This 
policy contributed to the two ensuing 
recessions and a significant lowering of 
the inflation rate. The opposite occurs 
when the central bank reduces the real 
interest rate below its natural rate. The 
result is temporarily higher output and 
an increase in the inflation rate.
However, a liquidity trap is a time 
when the central bank would like to 
bring the real rate down. Therefore, in 
theory, the central bank should desire 
an increase in near-term inflation that 
makes the real interest rate negative 
enough so that the economy is able to 
best cope with the fundamental factors 
that have reduced output growth. For 
example, suppose the natural real in-
terest rate is -3.0 percent and inflation 
expectations are 1.0 percent. The zero 
lower bound on nominal interest rates 
implies that the real interest rate in 
financial markets can, at best, be low-
ered to -1.0 percent. To lower the real 
rate to the natural rate would require a 
nominal rate of -2.0 percent, which is 
impossible.
This higher-than-natural real 
rate will serve to choke off aggregate 
demand beyond what occurs due 
to economic disturbances, and the 
economy will be in for a deeper reces-
sion than it otherwise would be. This 
is the situation in which the liquidity 
trap has severe consequences and why 
all central banks endeavor to keep the 
economy out of these circumstances.
As discussed, this is also the situa-
tion in which the nominal rate cannot 
be lowered further, and standard mon-
etary policy that relies on simple Tay-
lor-style interest rate rules is helpless 
in ameliorating the weakness in the 
economy. Unfortunately for Japan in 
the 1990s and the U.S. economy today, 
this is where we find ourselves. Fortu-
nately, there are policies the central 
bank can follow that will mitigate the 
effects of the liquidity trap, but policies 
in this situation involve departing from 
normal operating procedures and the 
rules that normally govern monetary 
policy. As a result, these alternative 
policies may be difficult to communi-
cate, and because liquidity traps are 
rare events, these policies may not be 
deemed fully credible since the public 
has little experience with these situa-
tions, as well.
MONETARY POLICY IN THE 
LIQUIDITY TRAP
Credibility is an essential feature 
of the simple policy I will discuss 
and a feature of any successful 12   Q2  2010 Business Review   www.philadelphiafed.org
monetary policy during a liquidity 
trap, and it may be an even more 
important ingredient than when the 
economy is functioning under normal 
circumstances.4 The reason is that 
the central bank must depart from 
its normal behavior, and the public, 
having little experience with a liquidity 
trap, may not believe that policy has 
actually changed. Absent perfect 
credibility, the policies described below 
would lead to very different and much 
less beneficial economic outcomes.
If the economy is in a liquidity 
trap and the weakness in the economy 
is significant, it may be desirable 
to generate an increase in inflation 
expectations. In our previous example, 
lowering the financial real interest 
rate to a desirable -3.0 percent requires 
inflation expectations to increase to 
3.0 percent. However, doing so requires 
the public to believe that future 
inflation will indeed reach 3.0 percent. 
The success of altering future 
policy also requires that the economy 
not be in the liquidity trap forever. 
Historically, all instances of actual 
liquidity traps have been temporary. 
The current crisis appears to be 
temporary as well, and it appears 
that the public believes this to be the 
case. That inference is based on the 
fact that long-term interest rates are 
currently positive. Because long-
term interest rates are an average of 
current and future short-term interest 
rates, a positive long-term interest 
rate implies that at some point in the 
future short-term interest rates will be 
positive as well. Hence, the evidence 
from long-term bond markets indicates 
that the zero lower bound will not 
last indefinitely. Liquidity traps, 
fortunately, appear to be temporary 
phenomena.
Role of Nominal Interest 
Rate in a Liquidity Trap. We have 
emphasized that there is nothing 
current monetary policy can 
accomplish while the economy is in a 
liquidity trap. However, once economic 
activity recovers to the point at which 
the nominal interest rate is positive, 
monetary policy can influence the 
level of economic activity. So at some 
point in the future, a lower-than-
normal future short-term nominal 
interest rate will stimulate future 
economic activity.
Generating increased output 
growth in the future can have 
consequences for current output. 
Investment now becomes more 
attractive, and firms may be reluctant 
to lay off as many workers if they 
are confident that higher than 
normal output is around the corner. 
Expectations of better times ahead will 
also stimulate current consumption. 
The cost of the future monetary 
stimulus will be that future inflation 
would be higher than it otherwise 
would have been.
Thus, in a standard theoretical 
model a commitment by the central 
bank to temporarily increase future 
inflation above what it would be 
in the absence of a liquidity trap is 
a beneficial policy response when 
the economy is in a liquidity trap. 
The central bank makes such a 
commitment because the gain in 
economic activity more than offsets 
the cost of somewhat higher inflation. 
But because the commitment pertains 
to future actions, it will have an effect 
only if the policy is believed. This 
feature is an important component 
of the influential work of Gauti 
Eggertsson and Michael Woodford, 
who have analyzed the liquidity 
trap in great depth. An important 
theme resonating throughout their 
analysis is policy’s ability to influence 
expectations and, importantly, 
inflationary expectations over long 
horizons. By doing so, the monetary 
authority influences the term structure 
of real interest rates and thereby 
influences current aggregate demand.5 
So, even in an environment where 
both prices and inflation respond 
slowly to economic shocks and 
monetary policy, the policies prescribed 
by Eggertsson and Woodford have 
substantial effects.
In their work, Eggertsson and 
Woodford show that the zero bound 
can cause a significant problem for 
monetary policy in the case in which 
the interest rate rule does not change 
when the economy exits the liquidity 
trap. That is, a Taylor-type rule that 
works fine in normal times may not 
work so well when there is a zero lower 
bound problem. 
5 The term structure of interest rates describes 
the relationship between interest rates on bonds 
of varying maturities. 
4 For a discussion of the importance of cred-
ibility in general, see my 2008 article and the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia’s 2007 
annual report.
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A particularly important result 
of their analysis is that many poli-
cies advocated in the popular press 
when the economy is in a liquidity 
trap with zero nominal interest rates 
are not useful. In particular, in their 
framework, not only are current open 
market operations, which exchange 
short-term bonds for money, irrelevant, 
but  temporarily providing additional 
bank reserves through increased open 
market operations will have no effect 
on the economy, irrespective of the 
types of assets the monetary authority 
purchases. 
This last result occurs because ef-
ficient pricing of, say, long-term bonds 
that are currently yielding a positive 
interest rate can have an effect on 
behavior only if those purchases imply 
a change in the path of short-term 
rates. This is because, as mentioned, 
long-term rates are merely an average 
of short-term rates.6 Thus, any policy 
response today that does not also re-
flect a change in future policy will not 
affect future economic activity. There-
fore, it will not affect future short-term 
interest rates and hence should not 
affect the long-term bond rate in any 
meaningful way. 
Two features of their model are 
responsible for the ineffectiveness of 
large-scale increases in central bank 
liabilities, often called quantitative 
easing: (1) any increases in money at 
the zero bound is done through open 
market operations and, therefore, 
does not affect the value of govern-
ment liabilities, and (2) any increase 
in money, even if it is accomplished 
via government transfers, is transi-
tory. Thus, as in the analysis by Alan 
Auerbach and Maurice Obstfeld, for 
increases in money to be beneficial, 
the increase must be permanent. By 
necessity, the underlying interest rate 
rule must change once the economy 
escapes from the zero lower bound. If 
policy returns to a normal interest rate 
rule, the money injected during the li-
quidity trap will have to be withdrawn 
to ward off an increase in the inflation 
rate. But this action would be inconsis-
tent with the higher inflation promised 
while the economy was in the liquid-
ity trap. Hence, if the public believes 
that upon exiting the liquidity trap the 
central bank would immediately return 
to normal policy, the promise of ad-
ditional near-term inflation would not 
have been believed in the first place.
Thus, a policy that permanently 
changes the monetary base today must 
also be associated with a change in the 
interest rate rule if it is to have effects. 
It is not just the current setting of the 
interest rate that is important, but the 
path that policy sets for future short-
term interest rates matters as well. This 
is analogous to saying that the system-
atic component of policy is important 
and that more importance should be 
attached to what will be done in the 
future than what is done today. 
But there is an additional subtlety 
here. As mentioned, a change in future 
policy implies that the central bank 
must tolerate additional inflation in 
the future even after the zero bound is 
no longer a problem. This policy leads 
to less deflation at the zero bound and 
greater output growth in the future. 
The increase in future output growth 
implies greater output growth in the 
present, when the zero lower bound is 
binding, and implies that the natural 
interest rate is somewhat higher in the 
current environment than it would be 
absent the promise of future inflation. 
Thus, Eggertsson and Woodford show 
that the economic losses associated 
with a real interest rate that is too low 
can be reduced.
A SPECIFIC POLICY
Eggertsson and Woodford provide 
specific policy advice for the central 
bank when a liquidity trap occurs. 
The specifics of their proposal are 
complex and particular to their 
model. However, they suggest that 
dealing with the public’s expectations 
when the economy is in a liquidity 
trap will take some skill on the part 
of any central bank. Interestingly, 
in their framework, a simple price-
level targeting rule comes very close 
to achieving the best outcome, and 
such a policy should be relatively 
easy to communicate. Rather than 
targeting inflation per se, as is typical 
of most central bank behavior, in a 
liquidity trap, the central bank should 
actually target the path of prices.7 The 
6 Eggertsson and Woodford’s argument is in fact 
more general and encompasses the govern-
ment’s purchase of any asset. 
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important distinction is that a price 
path implies that should inflation 
be relatively low today so that the 
price level is below its target, future 
inflation must increase to get the price 
level back on track. Therefore, the 
occurrence of deflation would require 
higher future inflation, and as we have 
seen, somewhat higher than normal 
inflation is a useful mechanism for 
ameliorating the adverse effects of a 
liquidity trap.8 
A price-level target is a way of 
formalizing that policy prescription. 
Because no central bank employs a 
price-level target, that could make 
credibility for this option problematic. 
The proposal could be couched as a 
time-varying inflation target, whereby 
the targeted inflation rate would be 
the rate that would get prices back to 
the price-level path. But, again, the 
public has little experience with such 
a rule. Thus, establishing credibility 
for future expansionary policy is an 
essential, but perhaps difficult, feature 
of successful policy at the zero lower 
bound.
Thus, a central message of 
Eggertsson and Woodford’s research is 
that the monetary authority must be 
able to commit to expansionary policy 
once the zero-lower-bound problem 
is alleviated. In particular, it must 
commit to higher inflation than would 
otherwise occur if the zero bound 
had not been reached. A proposal of 
raising the price of long-term debt 
or, equivalently, lowering long-term 
interest rates is consistent with the 
optimal lower future path of short-term 
rates. It could, therefore, be useful for 
a central bank to buy large quantities 
of long-term debt as a way of signaling 
its intention to increase near-term 
inflation and inflation expectations. In 
this case, not carrying through on its 
implied promise would result in a fall 
in bond prices and a capital loss for the 
central bank.9 
A LARGE INCREASE IN THE 
FED’S BALANCE SHEET
However, a potential challenge 
from the standpoint of the monetary 
authority is that once higher short-
term inflation is realized, the public 
will alter its expectations of inflation 
and the central bank will now be 
facing an inflation scare and the 
problems that accompany a departure 
of inflation expectations from target. 
Problems such as these have been well 
documented in Marvin Goodfriend’s 
study and discussed in my essay with 
Charles Plosser.
Thus, a lack of perfect credibility, 
which may be an unavoidable reality, 
acts as a two-edged sword that makes 
dealing with a liquidity trap difficult. 
Without full credibility, it is hard 
to generate an increase in inflation 
beyond what the public would 
normally expect, and if that inflation 
is generated, it subsequently may be 
difficult to return expectations of 
inflation to ones that are consistent 
with price stability. As discussions in 
the media suggest, the current large 
increase in the Federal Reserve’s 
balance sheet could represent such a 
threat to the credibility of the Fed’s 
long-run inflation target.10
The concern being expressed is 
that if it becomes difficult to unwind 
some of the assets currently on the 
balance sheet, the future money supply 
could be permanently higher. However, 
with interest rates returning to normal 
levels, the demand for money will not 
be permanently higher. A permanent 
increase in the money supply without a 
permanent increase in money demand 
can only lead to higher prices and 
higher inflation. 
Currently, there is every 
expectation that the Fed will 
successfully reduce its balance sheet 
as the banking system recovers, and 
survey data on inflation expectations 
confirm this belief. Managing that 
expectation is thus an important part 
of policy, as evidenced in a number 
of speeches by Federal Reserve 
policymakers, including Philadelphia 
Fed President Charles Plosser.11 It has 
become increasingly important for 
the Federal Open Market Committee 
(FOMC) to articulate an exit strategy 
and to indicate to the public that 
it will follow an exit strategy that 
does not ignite future inflation. 
8 In other models, such as the one in the study 
by Andrew Levin, David Lopez-Salido, Edward  
Nelson, and Tack Yun, a price-level target does 
not duplicate optimal policy nearly as well. 
Their model calls for even more aggressive 
policy, which leads to a permanent increase in 
the price-level path.
9 Alternatively, as Lars Svensson has suggested, 
the central bank could deflate the value of the 
currency using an exchange-rate peg. Doing so 
would require purchasing foreign assets, and 
this policy may also be useful in establishing 
credibility for higher inflation. If higher infla-
tion is not forthcoming, the home currency 
would appreciate, and the foreign assets on the 
central bank’s balance sheet would depreciate, 
resulting in a capital loss for the central bank. 
A lack of perfect 
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has more than doubled from $954 billion on 
September 17, 2008, to slightly more than $2 
trillion as of August 26, 2009.
11 See, for example, the speech by Charles 
Plosser.REFERENCES
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Indeed, the FOMC has been quite 
explicit concerning its intentions for 
maintaining long-run price stability.
SUMMARY
This article describes the 
difficulties of conducting monetary 
policy when there is a liquidity trap. 
A very weak economy can require 
negative real interest rates, and rates 
that are sufficiently negative can be 
hard to achieve when the short-term 
nominal interest rate is bounded 
below by zero. Although, in theory, 
generating increased expectations of 
future inflation is helpful, this may be 
difficult to achieve because standard 
monetary policy that targets a nominal 
interest rate is ineffective once 
nominal interest rates have reached 
zero. Achieving the necessary increase 
in expected inflation falls on promises 
of future policy, but successfully 
accomplishing this goal may require 
credibility for temporarily deviating 
from the central bank’s long-run 
inflation target. Furthermore, that 
deviation, if successful, could result 
in the public’s no longer believing in 
the long-run target. The central bank 
could face a future destabilization 
of inflation expectations and all the 
problems that ensue when that occurs. 
Thus, a liquidity trap is a 
perilous place for the economy 
and a central bank. Successfully 
navigating a liquidity trap requires 
open communication and transparency 
because it requires the public to 
understand not only current policy but 
future policy as well. B R
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